COMMENT

THE NUCLEAR OPTION: WHAT CAN STATES
DO TO ENCOURAGE CLEAN ENERGY
AFTER HUGHES AND EPSA?

JENNIFER KO†
In the absence of federal climate change policy, many states have adopted
programs that encourage clean energy generation from sources such as wind, solar,
and nuclear. Nuclear energy in particular remains an attractive option for a number
of states pursuing clean energy policies because of its ability to generate electricity
without producing any greenhouse gas emissions. Thus far, attempts by state regulators
to encourage intrastate clean generation have also been trailed by fierce legal
challenges from industry and consumer groups.
This Comment distills the case law on state clean energy programs, and focuses
on the legal issues that have been raised in litigation involving New York and Illinois’s
zero emission credit programs. It then proposes best practices that state regulators can
adopt when designing clean energy programs so as to reduce litigation risk. By
insulating their clean energy programs from legal challenges, states will be better
equipped to achieve their individual climate change goals.
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change has long been a thorny issue dividing parties and
administrations in the United States. For instance, although President Barack
Obama has publicly stated that the consequences of climate change are
“terrifying,”1 President Donald Trump, in contrast, has called climate change a
hoax “created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing noncompetitive.”2 In the absence of a coherent domestic approach to climate change,
many states have taken it upon themselves to adopt climate-friendly policies in
the two sectors that affect climate change most: transportation and electricity.3
Transportation and electricity generation account for more than half of
all greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. According to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, electricity generation was responsible for
29% of all domestic emissions in 2015, and transportation was responsible for
27%.4 The factor that unites these figures is clear—U.S. dependence on fossil
fuels. Fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and natural gas have powered domestic
economic development for decades, making it possible for average Americans
1 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Mark Landler & Coral Davenport, Obama on Climate Change: The
Trends Are ‘Terrifying’, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/08/
us/politics/obama-climate-change.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9ZST-5ELF].
2 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:15 AM), https://twitter
.com/realdonaldtrump/status/265895292191248385?lang=en [https://perma.cc/5DJV-UQAZ].
3 See The Editorial Board, States Will Lead on Climate Change in the Trump Era, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/26/opinion/states-will-lead-on-climate-change-in-thetrump-era.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/NZS7-H78T] (discussing efforts by states like New York,
California, Hawaii, and Massachusetts to reduce emissions from automobiles and power plants).
4 Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions [https://perma.cc/E7TL-3CQP].
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to power their homes, enjoy consumer goods, and travel autonomously. But these
benefits have come at a cost.5 The vast majority of electricity is generated from
burning coal and natural gas, whereas almost all fuel used domestically is
petroleum-based.6 And with climate change threatening to affect many aspects of
modern life, from the types of crops that are grown, to where American cities are
situated,7 concerted action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is necessary.
The advent of clean energy technologies such as wind, solar, and nuclear
has introduced the possibility of maintaining current standards of living while
simultaneously reducing emissions—and many states have taken notice.8
Nuclear energy in particular is an increasingly attractive option for a number
of states pursuing clean energy policies,9 though it remains a contentious
public issue.10 The fact that nuclear power plants are able to generate
electricity without producing any greenhouse gas emissions means that
nuclear energy will be key to achieving ambitious emissions reduction targets
for certain states. Thus far, any attempts by state regulators to encourage instate clean generation have also been trailed by fierce legal challenges from
industry and consumer groups.11 One key question emerges from these

5 See Fossil Fuels, ENVTL. AND ENERGY STUDY INST., http://www.eesi.org/topics/fossilfuels/description [https://perma.cc/SQ7N-GXMM] (explaining that coal is responsible for 32% of
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States; natural gas, 27%; and petroleum, 42%).
6 See Energy Use for Transportation, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/
energyexplained/?page=us_energy_transportation [https://perma.cc/WF6Q-6PG6] (stating that
approximately 92% of fuel used by the U.S. transportation sector in 2016 was derived from
petroleum); What is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3 [https://perma.cc/P2MX-UYT2] (indicating
that natural gas and coal accounted for 64.2% of domestic electricity generation in 2016).
7 Climate Change Impacts, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://19january2017
snapshot.epa.gov/climate-impacts_.html [https://perma.cc/6575-LC44] (indicating that climate
change will impact sectors as varied as agriculture, energy, human health, and transportation).
8 Jocelyn Durkay, State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 1, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfoliostandards.aspx [https://perma.cc/FL4W-GGNB] (stating that as of 2017, the majority of U.S. states
have adopted some type of clean energy goal or standard).
9 Clean Energy Standards: State and Federal Policy Options and Implications, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND
ENERGY SOLS. 1, 20-21 (2011), https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2011/11/Clean-Energy-StandardsState-and-Federal-Policy-Options-and-Implications.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9VF-LWG9] (discussing
clean energy promotion by Ohio and Indiana through nuclear energy).
10 See Rebecca Riffkin, For First Time, Majority in U.S. Oppose Nuclear Energy, GALLUP (Mar. 18,
2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/190064/first-time-majority-oppose-nuclear-energy.aspx [https://
perma.cc/54B8-H3VZ] (stating that 54% of Americans oppose nuclear energy whereas 44% favor
it—the first time that a majority of Americans have opposed nuclear energy since Gallup first began
asking the question in 1994).
11 See Allco Finance Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82, 86-87 (2d Cir. 2017) (dismissing a power
producer’s challenge to a Connecticut policy mandating contracts for renewable generators and to
Connecticut’s Renewable Portfolio Standard); Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp.
3d 554, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (dismissing a challenge to New York’s Clean Energy Standard); Village
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challenges: how can states adopt programs that achieve their energy goals
without triggering important legal tripwires?
This Comment distills the case law on state clean energy programs, and
identifies best practices for regulators designing programs that can withstand
legal challenges. In Part I, I discuss the factual background and policy reasons
behind state-led clean energy initiatives. In Part II, I examine the historical
allocation of regulatory authority over electricity between states and the
federal government, and introduce the constitutional hurdles that state
programs must overcome. In Part III, I discuss the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing12 and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n13 (FERC v. EPSA), which have reframed the
debate on the limits of states’ regulatory authority in the energy sector. In
Part IV, I examine ongoing litigation challenging nuclear energy subsidies in
New York and Illinois. In Part V, I provide recommendations for ways that
state regulators can design clean energy programs so that these programs are
able to withstand legal challenges.
I. STATE EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE CLEAN ENERGY
Clean and renewable energy sources—those that generate electricity
while producing zero or low emissions14—have an environmental advantage
over traditional fossil fuels. And in the absence of a national requirement to
use energy sources such as nuclear, wind, or solar in electricity generation,
states have spearheaded a number of efforts to encourage clean energy
development.15 States now have a variety of policy instruments available to
them, such as renewable portfolio standards, renewable energy credits, zero
emission credits, net metering, feed-in-tariffs, local carbon and greenhouse
gas regulations, and renewable system benefit charges.16
of Old Mill Creek v. Star, No. 17-1163, 1164, 2017 WL 3008289, at *18 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2017)
(dismissing a challenge by industry and consumer groups to an Illinois clean energy program).
12 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016).
13 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
14 See Renewable Energy Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energy
explained/?page=renewable_home [https://perma.cc/9VDM-FU7P] (explaining the difference between
renewable and nonrenewable energy).
15 See Keith Goldberg, States, Corporate America Will Fill Clean Energy Policy Gap, LAW360 (Mar.
14, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/901732/states-corporate-america-will-fill-clean-energypolicy-gap [https://perma.cc/EXN8-EHDJ] (discussing renewable energy policies at the state level).
16 See Steven Ferrey, Constitutional Disputes in Multiple Dimensions: The Washington Post, the
Wall Street Journal, and Sustainable Energy Law, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 251, 253 (2014)
[hereinafter Ferrey, Constitutional Disputes] (listing common renewable energy policies adopted by
states); REC and ZEC Purchasers, N.Y. STATE ENERGY RESEARCH & DEV. AUTH.,
https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/All-Programs/Programs/Clean-Energy-Standard/REC-and-ZECPurchasers [https://perma.cc/24XS-UWEW] (identifying zero-emission credits as one of the
requirements of New York’s Clean Energy Standard).
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One of the most well-established methods for states to encourage clean
energy generation is a renewable portfolio standard (RPS), which sets a target
for the amount of electricity in a particular jurisdiction that must come from
renewable sources.17 Although just one state, Iowa, had an RPS in 1983, RPSs
have become more common in the United States, and as of 2016, twenty-nine
states have adopted standards with an additional eight states adopting
nonbinding renewable energy goals.18 Because each state sets its own
renewable energy goals, standards vary from state to state. For instance,
although Hawaii has set a goal of sourcing 40% of its electricity from
renewable energy by 2030, Texas has chosen to procure a set number of
megawatts of electricity from renewable sources by 2015.19
The mechanism by which nearly all state RPSs encourage clean energy
generation is a renewable energy certificate (REC) program.20 On a
conceptual level, a REC reflects the principle that clean air and water have
some value to consumers, and that clean generators should be compensated
for the positive environmental attributes of their electricity.21 RECs can be
traded across markets22 so that, for instance, a natural gas plant in North
Dakota that is required to meet a state RPS of 10% renewable energy could
potentially buy RECs from a wind farm in Texas. The North Dakota gas plant
would be able to fulfill its state RPS obligation and the Texas wind farm
would also financially benefit from the sale of its REC. The price of a REC
is determined by supply and demand, although prices in different state

17 See Warren Leon, The State of State Renewable Portfolio Standards, CLEAN ENERGY STATES
ALL. 1, 3-5 (June 2013), http://cesa.org/assets/2013-Files/RPS/State-of-State-RPSs-Report-FinalJune-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/DBK9-FRRJ] (describing the ubiquity and public support for
RFPs, which are in place in twenty-nine states).
18 Durkay, supra note 8.
19 Leon, supra note 17, at 4.
20 Id. at 6 (observing that “RPSs have caused market players to think about renewable energy
development in a context that transcends state boundaries. For one thing, almost all states use
renewable energy certificates (RECs) as the mechanism for compliance with the RPS”).
Connecticut’s RPS, for example, requires “electric providers to obtain a specified percentage or
amount of the energy they generate or sell from renewable sources.” Connecticut Renewable Portfolio
Standard, STATE OF CONN. DEP’T OF ENERGY & ENVTL. PROT., http://www.ct.gov/
pura/cwp/view.asp?a=3354&q=415186 [https://perma.cc/W4EK-DN5Y]. Over a number of years,
providers are required to obtain increasing percentages of the energy they generate or sell from
renewable sources—from 19.5% in 2015 to 28% in 2020. Id. Providers can meet these obligations by
purchasing RECs from qualified renewable energy projects—either by buying the REC on its own,
or bundled along with the energy. Id.
21 See Frank J. Guarini Center on Environmental, Energy, and Land Use Law at N.Y.U. School
of Law, State Electricity Regulation in the Shadow of Hughes and EPSA, YOUTUBE (Nov. 14, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i7_bERo1hGU (explaining the general concept of RECs).
22 Leon, supra note 17, at 6.
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markets may vary depending on factors such as whether the state mandates
REC purchases or makes them voluntary.23
Apart from RPSs, states have also adopted a number of initiatives that are
shaping U.S. clean energy policy. As observed by scholars like Steven Ferrey,
85% of states have adopted net metering—a policy that compensates
customers for electricity that they generate and put back onto the grid—as
compared to the approximately 60% of states that have adopted RPSs.24
Additionally, a minority of states have adopted policies such as feed-in tariffs,
direct carbon and greenhouse gas regulations, and renewable system benefit
charges.25 Feed-in-tariffs, which guarantee payments to renewable energy
developers by requiring utilities to purchase certain types of power, have been
successful in stimulating renewable energy development in the United States
and internationally.26 Certain states have also adopted carbon or greenhouse
gas regulations individually or as part of a coalition. One of the most
prominent multistate coalitions is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative,
which was formed by nine Eastern states in 2009 to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions using a market-based, cap-and-trade approach.27 And finally,
renewable system benefit charges, which impose a monthly surcharge on
consumers that can be used to subsidize renewable energy projects, are
currently used by approximately one-third of U.S. states.28
Although increasing reliance on clean energy has clear benefits, the stateby-state approach to encouraging this type of generation has not been without
its hurdles. Practically speaking, relying on resources such as wind and solar
presents unique technical and financial challenges, as renewable sources of
energy may not be consistently available to power homes, and generating
facilities may be located far from consumers.29 Encouraging clean generation

23 U.S. Renewable Electricity Market, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
greenpower/us-renewable-electricity-market#prices [https://perma.cc/B69T-LL32] (explaining how
market prices for RECs are determined and vary in voluntary and mandatory markets).
24 Ferrey, Constitutional Disputes, supra note 16, at 253. But net metering policies vary from state
to state, such that the amount of power or compensation for net metering can be capped or otherwise
limited. Id. at 278.
25 Id. at 253.
26 Id. at 280-81; see also Toby D. Couture, et al., A Policymaker’s Guide to Feed-in Tariff Policy
Design, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/44849.pdf [https://
perma.cc/77DD-UL8N] (discussing the international success of feed-in tariffs).
27 Elements of RGGI, THE REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/
program-overview-and-design/elements [https://perma.cc/U6H7-MRZ3].
28 Ferrey, Constitutional Disputes, supra note 16, at 277.
29 See Renewable Energy Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/
energyexplained/?page=renewable_home [https://perma.cc/6RMT-8PE7] (describing some of the
technical challenges to widespread use of renewable energy).

2018]

The Nuclear Option

1273

can also raise legal issues, such as when growing state roles in the area of clean
energy trigger preemption and dormant Commerce Clause questions.30
II. THE HISTORICAL “BRIGHT-LINE” DIVISION BETWEEN
THE STATES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
UNDER THE FEDERAL POWER ACT
One Supreme Court decision has undergirded all modern challenges
involving the division between state and federal authority in electricity
regulation: Public Utility Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro.31 In Attleboro,
the Supreme Court shaped the future of energy law when it held that, under
the Commerce Clause, states are barred from regulating interstate electricity
sales and furthermore, that only Congress could fill this “regulatory void.”32
Taking a cue from the Court, Congress passed the Federal Power Act of 193533
to fill the gap left by the Attleboro decision, and created an early predecessor
of the modern U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).34
FERC is an independent agency that is empowered to regulate “the interstate
transmission of electricity, natural gas, and oil,” and “wholesale sales of
electricity in interstate commerce.”35
Under § 201 of the Federal Power Act, FERC has exclusive jurisdiction
over the “transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce,” the “sale of
electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce,” and “all facilities for
such transmission or sale of electric energy.”36 FERC thus has exclusive
authority over electricity that is “transmitted from a State and consumed at
any point outside thereof,” and electricity that is sold for resale, as opposed
to individual consumption.37 Any spheres outside of these explicit grants of
authority, such as retail electricity sold to consumers, are reserved for the
states.38 Although Congress intended this distinction between wholesale
electricity, which is regulated by the federal government, and retail electricity,
which is regulated by the states, to be an easily discernable “bright line,”39 it
has proven to be anything but.

30
31
32
33
34
35

Ferrey, Constitutional Disputes, supra note 16, at 288-92.
273 U.S. 83 (1927).
Id. at 89-90; FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 760, 767 (2016) (citing Attleboro, 273 U.S. at 90).
Federal Power Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791–828c (2012)).
FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 767.
What FERC Does, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/about/fercdoes.asp [https://perma.cc/8MK3-UE87].
36 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(a)–(b) (2012).
37 §§ 824(c)–(d).
38 § 824(a).
39 Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964).
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A. Preemption under the Federal Power Act
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal law
preempts contrary state law.40 Preemption can also be subdivided into
categories: express preemption, where Congress explicitly states that a
particular law preempts state law, and implied preemption, where federal
preemption can be inferred from the statute in question based on its structure
and purpose.41 The analysis for implied preemption then falls further into one
of two subcategories: conflict preemption and field preemption. Conflict
preemption can be inferred when a state and federal law conflict such that it is
impossible to comply with both, whereas field preemption can be inferred when
Congress has legislated so as to occupy the entire field of a substantive area.42
In either express or implied preemption, the Court has iterated that “the
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.”43
Two recent Supreme Court decisions—one on state preemption under
the Federal Power Act and the other on state preemption under the Natural
Gas Act—both used field preemption as a lens to analyze the proper
allocation of statutory authority between the states and the federal
government.44 As scholars like Matthew Christiansen have noted, the
Supreme Court’s field preemption inquiry in cases concerning the Federal
Power Act is “somewhat unusual” because it hinges on the question of
whether “‘the target at which the state law aims’ is a matter under FERC’s
exclusive jurisdiction.”45 A field preemption claim under the Federal Power
Act thus “turns not only on the scope of the exclusively federal field, but also
on the target of the potentially preempted state statute.”46

40 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . , shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”).
41 See Matthew R. Christiansen, Comment, FPA Preemption in the 21st Century, 91 N.Y.U. L.
REV. ONLINE 1, 3-4 (2016) [hereinafter Christiansen, FPA Preemption] (discussing the different
types of preemption).
42 Id.
43 Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016) (quoting Altria Group, Inc. v.
Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008)).
44 See id. (“A state law is preempted where ‘Congress has legislated comprehensively to occupy
an entire field of regulation.’” (quoting Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan.,
489 U.S. 493, 509 (1989))); Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (2015) (“Since the
parties have argued this case almost exclusively in terms of field pre-emption, we consider only the
field pre-emption question.”).
45 Christiansen, FPA Preemption, supra note 41, at 8 (quoting Oneok, 135 S. Ct. at 1599).
46 Id. at 8-9.
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B. Dormant Commerce Clause
Apart from preemption challenges related to the Federal Power Act, state
laws attempting to regulate electricity generation may also be vulnerable to
dormant Commerce Clause challenges. Under the Commerce Clause,
Congress has the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States . . . .”47 Embedded in this explicit grant of authority
is an implicit grant—also called the dormant Commerce Clause—that
prohibits states from discriminating against or burdening interstate
commerce.48 State laws can be struck down for discriminating against
interstate commerce if they are facially discriminatory, or have discriminatory
purposes or effects.49 Under the extraterritoriality doctrine, a state law can
also be struck down under the dormant Commerce Clause if it attempts to
control conduct outside of its borders.50 But when a state law is facially neutral
or lacks discriminatory purposes and effects, courts apply a balancing test to
weigh the putative local benefits against the burdens that the state law places
on interstate commerce.51 If the burdens outweigh the benefits, the court may
find that the law violates the dormant Commerce Clause.52
In the context of state laws encouraging clean energy, past lawsuits have
typically alleged that a particular policy is discriminating against out-of-state
electricity generation or attempting to control commerce beyond a state’s
borders by influencing wholesale markets.53 These types of challenges raise
difficult questions because of the inherently interconnected nature of the
market and energy itself. As Klass and Henley note, “Today’s energy markets
are interstate and interconnected, with fuels and electricity flowing in regional,
national, and international markets rather than intrastate, local markets.”54 And
as the Supreme Court has also acknowledged, “Trying to predict the flow
of electrons is akin to putting a drop of ink into a water pipe flowing into a
pool, and then trying to predict how the ink drop will diffuse into the pool, and
which combination of outflow pipes will eventually contain ink.”55

47
48

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth Henley, Energy Policy, Extraterritoriality, and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 127, 131 (2014) (describing the dormant
Commerce Clause as preventing “economic protectionist behavior”).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 133.
51 Id. at 132 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 128-29.
54 Id. at 129.
55 New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 32 (2002) (quoting P. FOX-PENNER, ELECTRIC UTILITY
RESTRUCTURING: A GUIDE TO THE COMPETITIVE ERA 27 (1997)).
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III. SUPREME COURT CASES SHAPING THE DEBATE
Two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have reframed the debate
surrounding the balance of regulatory authority between FERC and the
states: FERC v. EPSA and Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing. These decisions
have raised questions about how states can encourage clean energy generation
while avoiding serious legal tripwires.
In EPSA, the Supreme Court upheld one of FERC’s signature energy
policies—“demand response.” Demand response, unlike other programs that
ramp up electric generation to meet demand, encourages consumers to use
less electricity at times of peak demand by compensating them for their
reduced consumption.56 Because reducing demand not only lowers prices at
peak times but can also protect against grid failure, FERC has taken an active
role in encouraging demand response practices among wholesale market
operators.57 The FERC rule at issue in the case, Order 745, required wholesale
market operators to pay “as much for conserving electricity as generators do
for producing it”58—no small feat in the “big business” of demand response.59
Market experts have estimated that in one regional wholesale market alone,
aggregate capacity revenues in 2014 were $9 billion lower than they would
have been without a demand response program.60
The key question in EPSA was whether FERC’s demand response program
in Order 745, which mandated that providers who reduce demand be paid as
much as generators who produce electricity, impermissibly regulated retail sales
in violation of the Federal Power Act. In addressing this question, Justice Kagan,
56 See 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(b)(4) (2017) (defining demand response as “a reduction in the
consumption of electric energy by customers from their expected consumption in response to an
increase in the price of electric energy or to incentive payments designed to induce lower
consumption of electric energy”). See generally Demand Response Compensation in Organized
Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,658 (Mar. 24, 2011).
57 FERC, “[s]purred on by Congress,” chose to promote wholesale demand response programs
first in 2008 by issuing Order No. 719, which “requires wholesale market operators to receive demand
response bids from aggregators of electricity consumers, except when the state regulatory authority
overseeing those users’ retail purchases bars such demand response participation.” FERC v. EPSA,
136 S. Ct. 760, 763 (2016). FERC, “concerned that Order No. 719 had not gone far enough,” issued
another rule, Order No. 745, in 2011. Id. at 771. See generally Wholesale Competition in Regions With
Organized Electric Markets, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,100 (Oct. 28, 2008); Demand Response Compensation
in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,658 (Mar. 24, 2011).
58 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 771.
59 The Court Has Spoken: What Does it All Mean?, Energy Bar Association 2016 Annual
Meeting and Conference (Jun. 7, 2016), in 37 ENERGY L.J. 307, 310 (2016).
60 Id. at 310; see also MONITORING ANALYTICS, ANALYSIS OF THE 2017/2018 RPM BASE
RESIDUAL AUCTION 6 (2014), http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2014/IMM
_Analysis_of_the_2017_2018_RPM_Base_Residual_Auction_20141006.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8RN-QG
6Q] (noting that “the inclusion of Demand Resources and Energy Efficiency resources resulted in a 55.4
percent reduction in RPM revenues for the 2017/2018 RPM Base Residual Auction compared to what
RPM revenues would have been without any Demand Resources or Energy Efficiency resources.”).
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writing for the majority, analyzed three distinct questions: first, whether the
demand response practices in Order 745 directly affected wholesale rates;
second, whether FERC regulated retail sales by addressing demand response;
and third, whether holding that Order 745 violates the Federal Power Act would
conflict with the core purpose of the statute.61
On the question of whether Order 745 directly affected wholesale rates,
Justice Kagan noted that FERC is generally charged with ensuring that “any
rule, regulation, practice, or contract” affecting wholesale rates is just and
reasonable.62 Although FERC’s authority is limited to those rules or practices
that “directly affect” the wholesale rate, Justice Kagan concluded that Order
745 easily met this standard because wholesale demand response directly
reduces wholesale rates.63 In addressing the question of whether the Order
regulated retail sales, Justice Kagan acknowledged the economic reality that
wholesale and retail rates are inherently intertwined with each other.
However, she concluded that “[w]hen FERC regulates what takes place on
the wholesale market, as part of carrying out its charge to improve how that
market runs, then no matter the effect on retail rates, [the Federal Power Act]
imposes no bar.”64 And finally, on the question of whether striking down
Order 745 would subvert the purpose of the Federal Power Act, Justice Kagan
held that if, according to petitioner Electric Power Supply Association,
neither FERC nor the states has authority to regulate wholesale demand
response, FERC would be unable to authorize any proposed demand
response program moving forward.65 Such an outcome, Justice Kagan noted,
would “flout the FPA’s core objects” of “protect[ing] ‘against excessive prices’
and ensur[ing] effective transmission of electric power.”66
In concluding that Order 745 did not violate the bright-line separation
between retail and wholesale electricity sales, Justice Kagan also introduced a
new test for determining the limit of FERC’s authority to regulate rules and
practices that affect wholesale rates: the “direct effect” test.67 Under this test,
FERC can exercise jurisdiction over any rules or practices that “directly affect”
wholesale rates.68 Though the outer bounds of what constitutes a “direct effect”
remain unclear, a few general principles can be inferred from the opinion.

61
62
63
64
65
66
67

EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 773.
Id. at 774 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012)).
Id.
Id. at 776.
Id. at 780-81.
Id (quoting Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 343 U.S. 414, 418 (1952)).
Id. at 785 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the “direct effect” test adopted by the majority
may be a reasonable limit to FERC’s “affecting” jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act).
68 Id. at 774.
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Most broadly, FERC has authority under the Federal Power Act to
improve the operation of the wholesale market, even if the rules and practices
that it implements substantially affect the retail market.69 The Court’s
decision further hints that states’ authority over retail rates is limited to the
actual price that consumers are charged for electricity.70 In contrast, FERC
may regulate fairly expansively in a manner that affects retail purchasing
decisions, as long it does not set retail prices.71
Just a few months after the EPSA decision, the Supreme Court heard yet
another key case shaping domestic energy law: Hughes v. Talen Energy
Marketing. In Hughes, the Supreme Court invalidated a contract made
between the state of Maryland and a power plant on the grounds that
Maryland had impermissibly encroached on federal authority over wholesale
electricity rates. In the years leading up to the case, Maryland had determined
that electricity generation as it stood at the time would not suffice to meet
future in-state needs, and solicited offers from new electric generation
facilities.72 Critically, Maryland decided to assuage any profit concerns from
bidders by guaranteeing income for the selected generator in an unusual way:
a subsidy that would be provided as long as the generator was able to “clear”
a regional auction for wholesale electricity capacity.73 Ultimately, this
arrangement resulted in one particular Maryland power plant receiving a
price set in its contract with the state, unlike all other plants in the state,
which received a price set by the wholesale capacity auction.74
In a majority opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that
Maryland’s program was impermissible because it encroached on federal
authority to set the wholesale price of electricity, and was preempted under
the Federal Power Act.75 Importantly, the Court did not address the question
of whether the plaintiffs could seek declaratory relief for their preemption
69
70

Id. at 776.
See Matthew R. Christiansen, FERC v. EPSA: Functionalism and the Electricity Industry of the
Future, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 100, 105 (2016) (discussing the literal reading of FERC authority
under the Federal Power Act in EPSA and noting that the Court suggested that the “states’ exclusive
jurisdiction over the retail rate is limited to just that, the actual price consumers pay for electricity.
As a result . . . the FPA does not necessarily preclude FERC from regulating in a manner that
affects the retail purchasing decision, so long as it does not regulate the actual retail rate”).
71 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 776.
72 Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1-2, Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288
(2016) (No. 14-614) (describing how Maryland had determined it needed additional electrical
generation and had “solicit[ed] offers from developers willing to build facilities and sell power on a
long-term basis” as an undisputed fact).
73 Id. at 16.
74 Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1294-95 (2016) (explaining how the proposal,
unlike other bilateral contracts for capacity, guaranteed the contract price rather than relying on the
auction clearing price).
75 Id. at 1298-99.
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claim, and proceeded on the assumption that such relief was available.76 In
her preemption inquiry, Justice Ginsburg began with the observation that
FERC has exclusive authority to ensure that wholesale rates are “just and
reasonable,” and that the agency has deemed clearing prices produced by the
wholesale market to be “per se just and reasonable.”77 As a result, by paying
one generator a price different from the one set by the wholesale market,
Maryland disregarded this interstate rate and was thus preempted.78
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg noted that Maryland’s goal of encouraging in-state
generation “does not save its program” because “[s]tates may not seek to achieve
ends, however legitimate, through regulatory means that intrude on FERC’s
authority over interstate wholesale rates.”79 In her final words in the majority
opinion, Justice Ginsburg stressed the limited holding of Hughes, stating that:
We reject Maryland’s program only because it disregards an interstate
wholesale rate required by FERC. We therefore need not and do not address
the permissibility of various other measures States might employ to
encourage development of new or clean generation, including tax incentives,
land grants, direct subsidies, construction of state-owned generation
facilities, or re-regulation of the energy sector. Nothing in this opinion should
be read to foreclose Maryland and other States from encouraging production
of new or clean generation through measures “untethered to a generator’s
wholesale market participation.”80

Although the particular generator that Maryland selected was a natural
gas plant, and therefore not a clean generator, Hughes provides some key
lessons for states seeking to avoid preemption challenges to their clean energy
policies. In the context of preemption, states should be mindful of the
following two issues. First, states must carefully select the target at which the
state law aims. In discussing the failure of the Maryland program, the Court
cited another recent Supreme Court decision on the scope of federal
authority under the Natural Gas Act and observed that although state laws
may “incidentally affect areas within FERC’s domain,” a preemption claim
“turns on ‘the target at which the state law aims.’”81 Second, states seeking to
avoid preemption challenges must use a mechanism of encouraging clean

76 Id. at 1296 n.6 (stating that “[b]ecause neither CPV nor Maryland has challenged whether
plaintiffs may seek declaratory relief under the Supremacy Clause, the Court assumes without
deciding that they may”).
77 Id. at 1290.
78 Id. at 1298.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 1299 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
81 Id. at 1298 (quoting Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1599 (2015)).
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generators that is “untethered to a generator’s wholesale market participation.”82
In Hughes, the “tethering” that the Court took issue with was the structure of the
contract between Maryland and its selected generator, which conditioned the
generator’s subsidy on its capacity clearing the wholesale auction.
Although the Court did not address any dormant Commerce Clause
issues in its opinion, it did note that these arguments were raised and rejected
in the district court.83 The district court rejected all arguments made by Talen
Energy—then operating under a different name84—that the Maryland
program violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The district court held that
Maryland’s decision to site the new plant in either Maryland or the District
of Columbia did not facially, practically, or by its purpose discriminate against
interstate commerce, and did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.85
The district court further held that under the balancing test laid out in Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc.,86 which requires the benefits of a state law to be weighed
against any burdens placed by the law on interstate commerce, Maryland’s
legitimate interest in providing its residents an “adequate and reliable supply
of electric energy” outweighed any such burdens.87
In the context of dormant Commerce Clause challenges, the district court
opinion in Hughes provides additional guidance for states. The opinion raises the
possibility that a state can avoid a dormant Commerce Clause claim if the state
itself constructs, owns, and operates a plant, which will allow it to raise a market
participant defense.88 Under this defense, in certain situations when a state or
local government acts as a private actor in a marketplace, it is “free to operate
without Commerce Clause hindrance.”89 However, the district court was careful
to clarify that providing a subsidy for a particular plant alone is not sufficient to
“transform it into a form of state participation in the free market.”90

82 Id. at 1299 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 40, Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136
S. Ct. 1288 (2016) (Nos. 14-614, 14-623)) (emphasis added).
83 Id. at 1296 n.7 (“Respondents also raised arguments under the Dormant Commerce Clause
. . . . The District Court rejected those arguments . . . the Fourth Circuit did not address them, and
they are irrelevant at this stage.”).
84 See Company Overview of Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/
research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=4308276 [https://perma.cc/EC9B-9BVF] (explaining that
Talen Energy was formerly known as PPL EnergyPlus and changed its name in June 2015).
85 PPL EnergyPlus, LLC. v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790, 851 (D. Md. 2013).
86 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (explaining the balancing test).
87 Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 854-55.
88 Id. at 844 (holding that the market participant defense cannot be used by Maryland in this case
because the Public Service Commission “procured a market actor, CPV, to construct, own, and operate a
private facility in the interstate energy market and then used its regulatory authority to order other market
actors, and ultimately Maryland ratepayers, to provide the Facility with financial backing”).
89 Id. at 843.
90 Id. at 848 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988)).
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Ultimately, Hughes and EPSA provide several takeaways for states that
wish to encourage in-state clean generation.91 Under EPSA, the Court’s
understanding of FERC’s authority under the Federal Power Act to regulate
in a way that affects retail purchasing decisions may imply that state authority
in this area has correspondingly narrowed.92 Under the preemption analysis
of Hughes, states must be careful when selecting the target at which a state
law aims so as to avoid targeting an area of exclusive FERC jurisdiction, and
avoid tethering any financial incentive for clean generators to their
participation in the wholesale market.93 And under the dormant Commerce
Clause analysis of the district court’s opinion in Hughes, a state’s decision to
construct and operate a plant may also provide it with a market participant
defense that shields it from dormant Commerce Clause challenges altogether.
IV. CHALLENGES TO ILLINOIS AND NEW YORK’S
NUCLEAR PROGRAMS
In the wake of the Hughes and EPSA decisions, all eyes are on state programs
that may meet the same fate as the Maryland program in Hughes. One of the
most prominent state regulatory schemes designed to meet intrastate clean
energy goals is New York’s Zero Emission Credit program. Similarly, Illinois’s
Zero Emission Credit program has also drawn attention for its attempt to meet
in-state emission goals by compensating nuclear plants.
A. New York and Illinois’s ZEC Programs
In 2016, New York regulators approved a Clean Energy Standard that sets
an ambitious 50% renewable energy standard.94 According to current
91 A number of scholars have proposed models for determining whether a state program is
vulnerable to preemption or dormant Commerce Clause challenges. See generally Joel B. Eisen, Dual
Electricity Federalism is Dead, But How Dead, and What Replaces It?, 8 GEO. WASH. J. OF ENERGY &
ENVTL. L. 3 (2017) (discussing the viability of state programs like New York after the EPSA, Hughes,
and Oneok decisions); Scott Hempling, High Wholesale Prices: States’ Paths for Protection, Energy
Policy Roundtable in the PJM Footprint (June 29, 2016), http://pjm.raabassociates.org/main/
roundtable.asp?sel=143 [https://perma.cc/25V2-UEXK] (listing characteristics of state energy
programs that make them more vulnerable to legal challenges).
92 Christiansen, supra note 70, at 105. But see Jim Rossi and Jon Wellinghoff, FERC v. EPSA
and Adjacent State Regulation of Customer Energy Resources, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 23, 24 (2016)
(describing EPSA as a “victory for state policy flexibility” and characterizing the Court’s reasoning
as endorsing “pragmatism over formalism in the regulation of energy markets”).
93 Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016) (holding that states may
encourage new or clean generation “untethered” to a generator’s wholesale market participation).
94 Governor Cuomo Announces Establishment of Clean Energy Standard that Mandates 50% Renewables
by 2030, PRESSROOM OF GOVERNOR ANDREW M. CUOMO, https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/
governor-cuomo-announces-establishment-clean-energy-standard-mandates-50-percent-renewables
[https://perma.cc/YZV2-4VN5] (announcing the establishment of “the most comprehensive and
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estimates, the RPS, if successful, will reduce greenhouse gas emissions from
the state by 40% by 2030.95 One of the key components of the Clean Energy
Standard is a mechanism—the Zero Emissions Credit (ZEC) program—that
will provide financial support to aging nuclear plants in the state. Under the
ZEC program, nuclear plants, which do not produce any greenhouse gases in
electricity generation, will be compensated for the positive environmental
attributes of their zero-emissions electricity.96
According to New York state regulators, the state’s nuclear plants prevent
over fifteen million tons of carbon dioxide from being emitted each year,
meaning that the loss of any single plant and subsequent replacement by one
powered by fossil fuels will result in increased emissions.97 Faced with a
number of aging nuclear plants on the brink of retirement, state regulators
have designed the ZEC program to encourage these plants to remain in the
marketplace and continue providing their zero-emission electricity. Under
the program, qualifying nuclear plants will be able to sell their ZECs to a
state body and all load-serving entities that serve customers in New York will
be required to buy ZECs.98
For qualifying nuclear plants, the program is structured so that each plant will
have a twelve-year contract to sell ZECs that will be subdivided into six two-year
periods.99 During the initial two-year period, a qualifying plant will receive a flat
amount of $17.54 per megawatt hour of electricity generated.100 During subsequent
two-year periods, the amount of the subsidy will vary depending on a
predetermined formula based on the social cost of carbon.101 By rewarding nuclear
plants for their positive environmental attributes and requiring buyers to
purchase these environmental credits, state regulators argue that the program will

ambitious clean energy mandate in the state’s history, to fight climate change, reduce harmful air
pollution, and ensure a diverse and reliable energy supply”).
95 Id. (“By 2030, the 50 percent renewable mandate will be a critical component in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions by 40 percent (from 1990 levels) and by 80 percent by 2050.”).
96 Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, STATE OF NEW YORK PUB. SERVICE COMM’N 1,
19-20 (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/All-Programs/Programs/Clean-Energy-Standard
[https://perma.cc/29MG-BWND] [hereinafter Clean Energy Order].
97 Id. at 19.
98 Id. at 19-20.
99 Id. at 20.
100 Id. The original Order references a different price of $17.48 per megawatt hour of electricity.
The new ZEC price of $17.5394 is available in the NYSERDA’s most recent ZEC Agreement. See
2017 Compliance Year, N.Y. STATE ENERGY RESEARCH & DEV. AUTH., https://www.nyserda
.ny.gov/All-Programs/Programs/Clean-Energy-Standard/REC-and-ZEC-Purchasers/2017Compliance-Year [https://perma.cc/TVP9-NDFW].
101 For the full formula on how subsidies in tranches 2-6 will be calculated, see Clean Energy
Order, supra note 96, at 131 (describing the general formula as the social cost of carbon – baseline
RGGI effect – amount forecast prices exceed $39/MWh = ZEC Price ($/MWh)).
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“contribute uniquely to serving the long-term goal of achieving a largely decarbonized energy system by the middle of the century.”102
Much like New York, Illinois has recently taken steps to fundamentally
reshape the state’s energy generation profile into one that is more
environmentally friendly through legislation. In December 2016, the Illinois state
legislature passed the “Future Energy Jobs Act,” which, among other goals, seeks
to keep aging nuclear power plants in the marketplace as a source of zeroemission energy.103 The legislation, which is expected to save 4200 jobs in the
state and generate more carbon-free power than all of Illinois’s renewables
combined, has been called “the most significant climate bill and clean energy
economic development package in Illinois history,” and will, according to one
estimate, spur twelve to fifteen billion dollars of private investment in the state.104
The Illinois Act has three main prongs—energy efficiency,105 guaranteed
funding to encourage renewable project development,106 and a ZEC program.
Much like New York’s ZECs, the statute establishes a zero-emission standard
that will provide an approximately $235 million annual credit to qualifying
nuclear plants for their “carbon-free energy.”107 The practical effect of the
ZECs, as noted by industry opponents of the program, is that qualifying

102
103

Id. at 20.
See Nick Magrisso, Future Energy Jobs Bill: A Path for Illinois to a Bright Clean Energy Economy,
NRDC EXPERT BLOG (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/nick-magrisso/future-energyjobs-bill-path-illinois-bright-clean-energy-economy [https://perma.cc/P397-EGJP]; Peter Maloney,
How the Illinois Energy Reform ‘Fixed’ the State’s RPS, Promising a Renewables Boom, UTILITYDIVE
(Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/how-the-illinois-energy-reform-fixed-the-statesrps-promising-a-renewab/432877/ [https://perma.cc/Z4XZ-F3DV] (describing how the state
legislation “aim[s] to fix the state’s renewable portfolio standard and . . . revive renewable energy
development” while also bailing out two nuclear power plants owned by Exelon Corporation).
104 See Kari Lydersen, Major Illinois Energy Bill Advances With Two Days Left in Session, MIDWEST
ENERGY NEWS (Nov. 29, 2016), http://midwestenergynews.com/2016/11/29/major-illinois-energybill-advances-with-two-days-left-in-session/ [https://perma.cc/6PX8-8BNR] (quoting Andrew
Barbeau, a consultant for the Environmental Defense Fund).
105 Under the program, utilities will be required to slowly but steadily reduce electricity
consumption based on annual reduction targets. See Future Energy Jobs Act, Pub. Act 099-0906,
99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2016) (detailing the annual targets that utilities that serve more than three
million retail customers in the state will have to reach by 2030).
106 The bill will further encourage energy developers to build renewable energy projects by
guaranteeing funding—a measure that will aid Illinois in reaching its RPS goal of sourcing 25% of
its power from renewable sources by 2025. See Peter Maloney, Why Exelon’s Mammoth Illinois Energy
Bill Could Set a Precedent for Other States, UTILITYDIVE (Dec. 12, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com
/news/why-exelons-mammoth-illinois-energy-bill-could-set-a-precedent-for-other-s/432089/ [https
://perma.cc/M9T9-KYFX] (stating that the bill includes an annual $180 million enhancement to the
state’s RPS that will eventually expand to $220 million).
107 Rod Walton, Illinois Passes Subsidy Bill to Save State’s Nuclear Power Plants, ELECTRIC LIGHT
& POWER (Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.elp.com/articles/2016/12/illinois-pass-subsidy-bill-to-savestate-s-nuclear-power-plants.html [https://perma.cc/S92R-P8VP].
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nuclear plants will receive almost double the compensation that traditional
power plants will receive for their energy.108
Yet, some key differences exist between the two ZEC programs—for
instance, Illinois will provide each qualifying plant with a single ten-year contract
for subsidies that will last until 2027, rather than the six two-year contracts that
New York has proposed.109 And although both states will incorporate the social
cost of carbon to calculate the price of a ZEC, Illinois is using a different formula.
Under the Illinois program, the price for each ZEC will equal the social cost of
carbon in any given year, but if electricity prices happen to increase in a particular
year, the subsidy will be adjusted downward using a formula that considers the
market price index.110 This price adjustment, according to the Illinois Act, is
intended to protect consumers from rising electricity prices.111
Given the striking similarities between the New York and Illinois
programs, the future of these ZEC programs will be determined by ongoing
litigation. As one industry expert has described, “the DNA of the Illinois law
is the New York Clean Energy Standard. If New York stands, they all stand;
if New York falls, they all fall.”112
B. Federal Litigation Involving the ZEC Programs
New York’s and Illinois’s ZEC programs, which have now gone into effect,113
were pressed by legal challenges soon after their introduction in 2016. This
Section provides a short summary of the issues addressed thus far in cases
decided by the United States District Courts for the Southern District of New
108 See EPSA Strongly Urges FERC to Protect Consumers and Markets from Distorting Out of Market
Subsidies, ENERGY CENTRAL (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.energycentral.com/news/epsa-strongly-urgesferc-protect-consumers-and-markets-distorting-out-market-subsidies [https://perma.cc/YP9N-SDWS]
(quoting statements made by EPSA President John Shelk on New York and Illinois’s ZEC programs).
109 See Future Energy Jobs Act, 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3855/1-75(d-5)(1) (West 2017)
(stating that, “[t]he duration of the contracts procured under this subsection (d-5) shall be for a term
of 10 years ending May 31, 2027”); Clean Energy Order, supra note 96, at 19-20.
110 See Future Energy Jobs Act, 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(B) (West 2017)
(“The price for each zero emission credit . . . shall be in an amount that equals the Social Cost of
Carbon . . . . However . . . if electricity prices increase, the price in an applicable delivery year shall
be reduced below the Social Cost of Carbon by the amount (“Price Adjustment”) by which the
market price index for the applicable delivery year exceeds the baseline market price index . . . . If
the Price Adjustment is greater than or equal to the Social Cost of Carbon in an applicable delivery
year, then no payments shall be due in that delivery year.”).
111 Id. (justifying the price reduction below the social cost of carbon as intended “to ensure that
the procurement remains affordable to retail customers in this State”).
112 Maloney, supra note 106 (quoting Raymond Gifford, the former chairman of the Colorado
Public Utility Commission).
113 New York’s program was scheduled to go into effect in April 2017. See Complaint at 3, Coal.
for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 16-08164) [hereinafter
Zibelman Complaint]. Illinois’s legislation took effect on June 1, 2017. See Future Energy Jobs Act,
20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3855/1-5(A) (West 2017).
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York and the Northern District of Illinois. As of the time of this writing, appeals
are pending in the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second Circuit and
the Seventh Circuit. Although they are supported by distinct reasoning, the
opinions provide valuable guidance on the substance of these claims.
In New York, a number of industry organizations joined together in
October 2016 to file a lawsuit against the New York Public Service Commission
alleging that the ZEC program “intrude[s] on the exclusive authority of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission . . . over ‘the sale of electric energy at
wholesale in interstate commerce.’”114 In the case, Coalition for Competitive
Electricity v. Zibelman, Hughes provided a natural launching point for the
industry plaintiffs to challenge New York’s program. The plaintiffs in Zibelman
raised two main arguments before the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York: that the ZEC program was preempted by the Federal
Power Act under the Supremacy Clause, and that the program violated the
dormant Commerce Clause because it “solely benefit[s] certain wholesale
producers of nuclear energy in New York, to the disadvantage of out-of-state
producers who compete in the wholesale market.”115
Just a few months later, in February 2017, consumer and industry plaintiffs
filed suit to challenge Illinois’s ZEC program. In that case, Village of Old Mill
Creek v. Star, the consumer and industry plaintiffs raised similar arguments
of preemption under the Federal Power Act and violations of the dormant
Commerce Clause before the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois. The consumer plaintiffs in Star also brought Fourteenth
Amendment claims on the ground that the Illinois statute denied them the
“equal protection of federal laws governing the wholesale electricity
markets.”116 This argument was based on the assertion that the program would
impose additional costs on Illinois consumers who consume electricity from
ZEC-receiving nuclear plants, but would not impose those costs on
consumers in neighboring states.117
In Zibelman, Judge Valerie Caproni granted the New York Public Service
Commission member-defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that no private
right of action exists for the industry-plaintiffs’ preemption claims, and that even
if such a right of action existed, that the claims “would fail as a matter of law.”118
Because the Federal Power Act does not provide a private right of action, the
court reasoned, any preemption claim would fall under the court’s equity
114
115
116
117

Zibelman Complaint, supra note 113, at 1 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012)).
Id. at 6, 39-41.
Village of Old Mill Creek v. Star, No. 17-1163, 1164, 2017 WL 3008289, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2017).
Id. at *17-18. The court disposed of the consumer-plaintiffs’ equal protection claim by noting
that the ZEC program had a rational relationship to the state’s environmental objectives. Id. This
claim was addressed only briefly and will not be discussed further in this Comment.
118 Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
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jurisdiction.119 Furthermore, because Congress provided a “sole remedy” in the
Act, the court concluded that parties are implicitly foreclosed from invoking
equity jurisdiction to challenge state laws that allegedly violate the Act.120
Despite these initial findings, the court proceeded to discuss the merits
and held that even if a private right of action exists, the plaintiff ’s preemption
claim must fail because New York’s program is neither field preempted nor
conflict preempted. The field preemption claim must fail, the court reasoned,
because New York’s program does not mandate that a generator participate in
the wholesale auction to receive a ZEC.121 Thus, the court concluded that
New York’s program remains distinct from the Maryland program at issue in
Hughes because it does not “condition or tether ZEC payments to wholesale
auction participation.”122 Furthermore, although the ZECs allow
noncompetitive plants to participate in the wholesale auction, New York’s
program does not “directly adjust, alter, or affect the wholesale rate.”123
Similarly, the court held that the plaintiffs’ conflict preemption claim must
fail because the ZEC program would not cause “clear damage” to federal goals
and interfere with FERC’s regulatory objectives.124 The court noted that New
York was not setting a wholesale price that “displaces the market-determined
price” and that FERC had already approved programs such as those that
impose intrastate renewable portfolio mandates in the past.125
The court also rejected the industry-plaintiffs’ dormant Commerce
Clause claims on the ground that the plaintiffs did not allege a cause of
action.126 According to the court, the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were not
related to protecting out-of-state interests, and did not fall within the zone
of interests protected by the dormant Commerce Clause. The plaintiffs’
alleged undue burden on out-of-state interests also fell outside of the zone of
interests, the court held, because offering ZECs to out-of-state nuclear plants
would not alleviate the market distortion effect that the plaintiffs alleged.127
In Star, Judge Manish Shah granted the Illinois Power Agency-defendant’s
motion to dismiss, and similarly proceeded to discuss the merits of the case.128
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *14.
Id.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *17-18.
Id. at *17.
Id. at *21.
Id. at *20.
Much like the court in Zibelman, the court in Star also held that no private cause of action
exists in the Federal Power Act, apart from the explicit remedies laid out by Congress. Village of
Old Mill Creek v. Star, No. 17-1163, 1164, 2017 WL 3008289, at *10-14 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2017). But
unlike the Zibelman court, the Star court held that the Federal Power Act’s mandate to ensure “just
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The court held that the industry plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to challenge
the price adjustment feature of Illinois’s ZECs, and also lacked Article III
standing for their dormant Commerce Clause claims.129 For both conclusions, the
court reasoned that the alleged injuries caused by the ZEC subsidies were not
traceable to the ZEC program’s price adjustment feature, or to discrimination
against the commerce of other states.130 In contrast, the consumer plaintiffs did
have Article III standing because their alleged injuries—ZEC charges on retail
electricity bills—were traceable to the Illinois law and could be redressed.131
However, the consumer plaintiffs lacked prudential standing under the Federal
Power Act and could not bring a preemption claim because their injuries were
based on an anticipated retail surcharge.132
The court also held on the merits that the Illinois ZEC program influenced
which generators can participate in the wholesale auction, but did not replace the
auction clearing price or otherwise “directly affect” the wholesale rate.133
According to the court, the Illinois program’s price adjustment feature, which
references a market price index, did not raise the “tethering” issues that were key
in Hughes.134 The court noted that, as a technical matter, generators do not even
need to participate in the wholesale auction to receive ZECs.135
The industry plaintiffs in Zibelman appealed the decision of the district court
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on August 24,
2017.136 The plaintiffs in Star likewise appealed the decision of the district court
to the Seventh Circuit on July 17, 2017.137 These appeals are currently pending.

and reasonable” rates was judicially unadministrable, and further supported the conclusion that
Congress did not intend to provide an implicit private cause of action. Id. at *6-9.
129 Id. at *5-8.
130 Id.
131 Id. at *6.
132 Id. The court held that because the Federal Power Act explicitly gives states the power to
regulate retail sales and impose retail charges, these consumer interests fell “outside of the zone of
interests of the federal statutes.” Id.
133 Id. at *13-14.
134 Id.
135 See id. at *13 n.30 (noting that, for instance, a generator in Illinois could seek approval to
sell energy at retail and forego the wholesale auction altogether and still receive ZECs).
136 Notice of Appeal at 1, Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554
(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 16-8164).
137 Notice of Appeal at 1, Village of Old Mill Creek v. Star, No. 17-1164, 2017 WL 3008289
(N.D. Ill. July 17, 2017).
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS: WAYS STATES CAN STRUCTURE
CLEAN-ENERGY PROGRAMS TO WITHSTAND
LEGAL CHALLENGES
In light of these ongoing challenges, the opinions in Hughes, EPSA,
Zibelman, and Star offer guidance to state regulators who are designing
programs aimed at encouraging the in-state generation of clean energy. This
Part proposes several best practices for designing state programs to withstand
preemption and dormant Commerce Clause challenges. The broadest lesson
from these recent decisions is that states may provide subsidies or other
incentives that give certain generators an advantage entering the wholesale
auction, as long as the incentive is not conditioned on the generator’s
participation in the wholesale market.138 States also have flexibility as to how
they select the substance of the subsidy, such as in the form of a direct subsidy,
tax incentive, or other incentive.139 Yet, states must address both preemption
and dormant Commerce Clause issues to sufficiently insulate their programs
from legal challenges.
A. Subsidy Calculation
The mechanism by which a state provides an incentive to a specific
generator, and the formula used to calculate that subsidy, can be crucial when
a state faces a preemption challenge. The formula for determining the value
of a subsidy must remain as minimally connected to the operation of the
wholesale market as possible, such as by being flat, or by being determined
by an alternative means that is entirely unrelated to the wholesale market. If
these options are unworkable, the subsidy formula may reference the
wholesale market indirectly, such as by incorporating a wholesale price index
that protects consumers from price fluctuations.
A flat subsidy, such as the first tranche of New York’s ZEC program, offers
the advantage of being entirely independent of the wholesale market. The
initial two-year period of the program provides three eligible nuclear plants
in New York with a set price of $17.54 per MWh of electricity produced.140
138 The fatal “tethering” in Hughes was that the plant was only eligible to receive the stateguaranteed subsidy if it cleared the wholesale capacity auction. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136
S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016).
139 The Court in Hughes explicitly stated that it would not address the permissibility of “tax
incentives, land grants, direct subsidies, construction of state-owned generation facilities, or reregulation of the energy sector” and that “[n]othing in this opinion should be read to foreclose . . .
States from encouraging production of new or clean generation through measures ‘untethered to a
generator’s wholesale market participation.’” Id. at 1299 (citation omitted).
140 See 2017 Compliance Year, N.Y. STATE ENERGY RESEARCH & DEV. AUTH., https://www.
nyserda.ny.gov/All-Programs/Programs/Clean-Energy-Standard/REC-and-ZEC-Purchasers/2017Compliance-Year [https://perma.cc/TVP9-NDFW].
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New York’s formula for this period relies solely on a projected social cost of
carbon less the revenues that the eligible plants would receive from a regional
greenhouse gas program, RGGI.141 Under this formula, the net cost of carbon
is $32.47, which is then converted to a cost per MWh to reach the final value
of $17.54.142 The calculation for the first two years of New York’s ZEC
program will not fluctuate in response to the wholesale market, leaving the
ZEC value flat during this period. The independence of a flat subsidy, which
does not fluctuate in response to market changes, avoids the potential for a
state’s subsidy to be tethered to rates set by FERC.
The value of the subsidy could also be determined by an alternative means
that is unrelated to the operation of the wholesale market, such as by supply
and demand in the free market. This approach would mirror the structure of
the REC program and California’s zero emission vehicle (ZEV) program, both
of which rely on supply and demand to reach a set price.143 Under California’s
ZEV program, automobile manufacturers are required to maintain a certain
number of ZEV credits based on a percentage of their total nonelectric vehicle
sales in a year.144 Each ZEV credit has no set value, and manufacturers can meet
their ZEV obligations by purchasing them from other manufacturers, banking
them, or other strategies.145 Similarly, REC pricing varies across markets based
on factors such as the region in which a generator is located, and market supply
and demand.146 Determining a subsidy’s value through these types of marketbased alternatives may be one way of keeping the subsidy from being tethered
to participation in a wholesale auction.
In addition, it may be acceptable for a state to reference the wholesale
market in its subsidy calculation as long as the reference is used as a price
adjustment tool that is designed to limit, rather than exacerbate any financial
harm. Illinois’s ZEC program is structured so that the ZEC formula
references a wholesale market price index.147 If electricity prices increase, the
price will be reduced by an amount “by which the market price index for the
applicable delivery year exceeds the baseline market price index for the

141 Clean Energy Order, supra note 96, at 130.
142 Id.
143 See CHUCK SHULOCK, MANUFACTURER SALES UNDER THE ZERO EMISSION VEHICLE
REGULATION 1 (2016), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/media-uploads/nrdc_commissioned

_zev_report_july_2016_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/NTY9-66X5].
144 Id. at 7.
145 Id.
146 See ERIC O’SHAUGHNESSY ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., STATUS AND
TRENDS IN THE U.S. VOLUNTARY GREEN POWER MARKET 13-14 (2015), https://www.nrel.gov/
docs/fy16osti/65252.pdf [https://perma.cc/QMB2-ZJWN] (discussing the factors that influence
REC pricing in different markets).
147 See Future Energy Jobs Act, 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(B) (West 2017).
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[prior] 12-month period.”148 However, if the market price index exceeds the
baseline market price index by an amount greater than or equal to the social
cost of carbon, qualifying plants will not receive any ZEC payments.149 This
adjustment mechanism is designed to protect consumers, and prevent them
from subsidizing nuclear plants that are being adequately compensated by the
market. In his discussion of the industry-plaintiffs’ Article III standing in Star,
Judge Shah noted that any injury caused by the state’s ZEC program “is not
traceable to the price adjustment, because that injury would exist even if the
statute were cured of its ties to wholesale auction prices.”150 Removing this price
adjustment feature, which serves as a corrective device, according to Judge
Shah, would exacerbate rather than alleviate the plaintiff ’s alleged harms.
B. Market Participation
Apart from the formula used to calculate the value of a subsidy, states may
also be able to insulate themselves from dormant Commerce Clause
challenges by acting as market participants instead of as regulators. States can
act as market participants rather than as regulators by taking actions that do
not “create a trade barrier or prevent or regulate the flow of energy.”151 As
noted by the Zibelman court, a state’s decision to distribute subsidies to aging
and otherwise noncompetitive plants is a valid form of market
participation.152 This market participant defense was also noted by the district
court in PPL Energyplus, LLC. v. Nazarian,153 the trial-level proceedings for
Hughes. The Nazarian court held that a state may act as a market participant
when it takes steps to own and operate a power plant, such as by “spending
its own funds to construct a power plant.” 154
C. Bid Selection Process
Furthermore, a state may reduce the risk of a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge by allowing out-of-state generators to submit bids during the selection
process to receive a subsidy. In Star, Judge Shah observed that Illinois’s program,
which based the selection process on specified “public interest criteria,” did not
148
149
150
151
152

Id.
Id.
Village of Old Mill Creek v. Star, No. 17-1163, 1164, 2017 WL 3008289, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2017).
Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
Id. (finding that New York is “participating in the energy market” and favoring its citizens by
“distributing subsidies through the ZEC program to otherwise financially struggling nuclear power plants”).
153 PPL EnergyPlus, LLC. v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790 (D. Md. 2013).
154 Id. at 844; see also TVA at a Glance, TENN. VALLEY AUTH., https://www.tva.com/AboutTVA/TVA-at-a-Glance [https://perma.cc/L255-GDGP] (explaining that the Tennessee Valley
Authority is the largest government-owned power provider in the United States).
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preclude out-of-state generators from participating in the process alongside instate generators.155 An out-of-state generator could hypothetically have submitted
a bid to be considered for the subsidy, a point, which according to Judge Shah,
reduced the potential discriminatory impact of the program.156
Although the options presented above may insulate a state from legal
challenges, state regulators may be animated by valid concerns that lead them
to structure their clean energy programs in different ways. For instance,
providing a flat subsidy to clean generators that is inflexible to market price
signals may be unfair to consumers, who are ultimately responsible for
bearing the costs of these subsidies. Similarly, a regulator may choose to
forego a subsidy value that is determined by the free market because the value
produced by such a mechanism may be insufficient to meaningfully subsidize
generators. Despite these issues, these options remain avenues for future
consideration by state regulators.
CONCLUSION
Many news commentators have remarked that, given the current political
climate, states will likely be the central actors advancing U.S. policy on
climate change over the next few years.157 But apart from the political
challenges that states must overcome in their efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, they must also overcome legal challenges. Programs in states like
New York and Illinois, which seek to subsidize zero-emission nuclear
generators, have been challenged by industry groups and consumers on the
grounds that they violate the dormant Commerce Clause, and are preempted
under the Federal Power Act. Furthermore, the Hughes and EPSA decisions
warn that a state’s “tether” to wholesale rates must be distinguishable from a
direct effect on wholesale rates.158
In light of these difficulties, states must tread carefully to encourage clean
generation within their borders while avoiding legal pitfalls. Despite these
uncertainties, state regulators interested in designing clean energy policies

155 See Star, 2017 WL 3008289 at *15 (“The statute is not facially discriminatory because it does
not preclude out-of-state generators from submitting bids for ZECs.”).
156 Id.
157 The Editorial Board, supra note 3; Adam Nagourney & Henry Fountain, California, at
Forefront of Climate Fight, Won’t Back Down to Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/26/us/california-climate-change-jerry-brown-donald-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/6D5S-GUD9]; Adam Withnall, US States Vow to Push Ahead in Fight Against
Climate Change—With or Without President Trump’s Blessing, INDEP. (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.
independent.co.uk/environment/president-donald-trump-cop22-climate-change-california-statesa7423816.html [https://perma.cc/7GV2-4LA8].
158 See Star, 2017 WL 3008289 at *13 (“EPSA and Hughes stand for the proposition that preemption
applies whenever a tether to wholesale rates is indistinguishable from a direct effect on wholesale rates.”).
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can take clear steps to insulate their programs from legal challenges.
Regulators may calculate the value of a subsidy to clean generators using a
formula that is as minimally connected to the wholesale market as possible,
such as a flat subsidy or one that is determined by supply and demand.
Alternatively, regulators may calculate the value of a subsidy using a metric
that references the wholesale market only indirectly, such as through a
wholesale price index. Furthermore, regulators may protect their programs
from legal challenges by taking steps to act as a market participant rather than
a regulator, and by allowing out-of-state generators to participate in the
selection process for receiving a subsidy.
Although some states may choose to apply the lessons from Hughes, EPSA,
Star, and Zibelman to encourage clean generation, other states may choose to
create policies that promote fossil fuels at all costs. Yet, the actions of states like
Connecticut and Pennsylvania to pursue policies similar to those of New York
and Illinois indicate broader popular interest in achieving clean energy goals.159
For these and similarly-minded states, the principles embodied in decisions like
Star and Zibelman expand the range of tools available to state regulators to
encourage clean generation. Regulators can provide subsidies to specific power
plants, as long as the subsidy is not conditioned on market participation,160
continue to employ RECs,161 enter into multistate compacts like the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative,162 and pursue state-set RPS goals.163

159 Sonal Patel, Connecticut, Ohio, Pennsylvania Make Substantive Gains for State Nuclear
Subsidies, POWER MAG. (Nov. 1, 2017), http://www.powermag.com/connecticut-ohio-pennsylvaniamake-substantive-gains-for-state-nuclear-subsidies/ [https://perma.cc/UGS2-N24D].
160 In response to a question by Justice Kagan about whether the state unconditionally giving
“a load of money” to a particular plant would be preempted, former U.S. Solicitor General Paul
Clement, responded that it would not be. Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Hughes v. Talen
Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016) (Nos. 14-614, 14-623). In response to a similar question by
Justice Sotomayor, Ann O’Connell, also arguing for the respondents, affirmed that a direct subsidy
that is not conditioned on market participation would not be problematic. Id. at 49-50.
161 The plaintiffs in Zibelman also did not contest the legality of RECs in their brief, explaining that,
because their prices are purely determined by supply and demand, RECs are not tethered “in any way to
wholesale electricity prices.” Zibelman Complaint, supra note 113, at 23; see also Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee,
Nos. 15-608, 16-508, 2016 WL 4414774, at *25 (D. Conn. Aug. 18, 2016) (holding that Connecticut’s RPS,
which requires utilities to buy renewable energy credits from generators located within New England, does
not violate the dormant Commerce Clause because “the RPS creates a market for RECs, rather than
impeding on a previously existing national market”), aff ’d, 861 F.3d 82 (2d. Cir. 2017).
162 See CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 393 (Daniel A. Farber & Marjan Peeters eds., 2016) (concluding that
despite speculation on whether RGGI is constitutional, suits challenging it have been unsuccessful).
163 See Allco, 2016 WL 4414774 at *25; see also Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169,
1171 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that Colorado’s renewable portfolio standard does not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause). But see Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating
in its discussion of in-state transmission projects that Michigan’s RPS “trips over an insurmountable
constitutional objection” and that “Michigan cannot, without violating the commerce clause of Article
I of the Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state renewable energy”).

